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I . QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1 . I s t h e C o u r t of A p p e a l s ' r e l i a n c e u p o n , and a p p l i c a t i o n 
o f , t h e law a s o u t l i n e d in F l eming v . F l e m i n g - F e l t C o . , 7 Utah 2d 
2 9 3 , 323 P . 2 d 712 ( 1 9 5 8 ) , j u s t i f i a b l e i n l i g h t of t h e t r i a l 
c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g t h a t Rocky M o u n t a i n ' s b r e a c h d i d n o t p r e v e n t Mr. 
Smi th from p e r f o r m i n g t h e c o n d i t i o n upon which h i s r i g h t t o t h e 
d i s p u t e d s t o c k d e p e n d e d ? 
2 . A s s u m i n g a r g u e n d o t h a t t h e F l e m i n g d e c i s i o n i s 
c o n t r o l l i n g in t h i s m a t t e r , d i d Mr. Smith i n t r o d u c e s u f f i c i e n t 
e v i d e n c e t o p r o v e t h a t t h e 1 1 , 4 4 5 s h a r e s of s t o c k awarded to him 
b y t h e C o u r t of A p p e a l s a c t u a l l y f i t w i t h i n t h e m e a s u r e of 
d a m a g e s , i . e . t h a t t h e 1 1 , 4 4 5 s h a r e s of s t o c k would have been 
r e t u r n e d t o Mr. Smi th b u t f o r Rocky M o u n t a i n ' s b r e a c h ? 
3 . Did t h e C o u r t of A p p e a l s ' r e v e r s a l of t h e t r i a l c o u r t 
o r d e r w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e d i s p o s i t i o n of 1 1 , 4 4 5 s h a r e s of s t o c k , 
i m p r o p e r l y i n v a d e t h e p r o v i n c e of t h e t r i a l c o u r t ? 
I I . REFERENCE TO THE OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS 
OF ANY OPINIONS ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The u n p u b l i s h e d o p i n i o n of t h e C o u r t of A p p e a l s was f i l e d 
w i t h t h e c l e r k of t h a t c o u r t on F e b r u a r y 8 , 1989 . A t r u e and 
c o r r e c t copy of t h a t o p i n i o n i s a t t a c h e d h e r e t o a s E x h i b i t "A" of 
t h e A p p e n d i x . On March 6 , 1 9 8 9 , t h e C o u r t of A p p e a l s i s s u e d i t s 
o r d e r d e n y i n g Rocky M o u n t a i n ' s p e t i t i o n f o r r e h e a r i n g . A t r u e 
and c o r r e c t copy of t h a t o r d e r i s a t t a c h e d h e r e t o a s E x h i b i t "B" 
of t h e a p p e n d i x . 
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I I I . STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
T h i s p e t i t i o n s e e k s r e v i e w o f an o p i n i o n o f t h e C o u r t o f A p p e a l s 
f i l e d w i t h t h e c l e r k o f t h a t c o u r t on F e b r u a r y 8 , 1 9 8 9 . 
T h e r e a f t e r , Rocky M o u n t a i n ' s p e t i t i o n f o r r e h e a r i n g was d e n i e d on 
March 6 , 1 9 8 9 . P e t i t i o n e r b e l i e v e s S e c t i o n 7 8 - 2 a - 4 , Utah Code 
Ann. ( 1 9 5 3 a s a m e n d e d ) , and R u l e s 4 2 - 4 8 o f t h e R u l e s o f t h e Utah 
S u p r e m e C o u r t , c o n f e r j u r i s d i c t i o n on t h i s c o u r t t o r e v i e w t h e 
d e c i s i o n o f t h e C o u r t o f A p p e a l s b y W r i t o f C e r t i o r a r i . 
IV. CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, AND REGULATIONS 
P e t i t i o n e r i s u n a w a r e o f a n y c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s , 
s t a t u t e s , o r d i n a n c e s , r u l e s , o r r e g u l a t i o n s t h a t w o u l d b e 
c o n t r o l l i n g i n t h i s m a t t e r . 
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
T h i s a c t i o n a r i s e s d u e t o a d i s p u t e w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e 
d i s p o s i t i o n o f 1 1 , 9 4 5 s h a r e s o f s t o c k i n R o c k y M o u n t a i n 
H e l i c o p t e r s , I n c . The s t o c k was i s s u e d t o Mr. S m i t h in December 
o f 1 9 8 2 , s u b j e c t t o s p e c i f i c r i g h t s o f r e c a l l in f a v o r o f Rocky 
M o u n t a i n H e l i c o p t e r s , I n c . T h o s e r i g h t s o f r e c a l l e s s e n t i a l l y 
p r o v i d e d t h a t Mr. S m i t h w o u l d b e n e f i t from t h e s h a r e s o f s t o c k 
i s s u e d t o h i m , i f Rocky M o u n t a i n H e l i c o p t e r s w e r e s o l d or e n g a g e d 
i n a p u b l i c o r p r i v a t e s a l e o f i t s s t o c k d u r i n g t h e t i m e when Mr. 
S m i t h was an e m p l o y e e . I f Rocky M o u n t a i n rfelicopters w e r e n o t 
s o l d , n o r were i t t o e n g a g e i n a p u b l i c or p r i v a t e s a l e o f i t s 
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stock, Mr. Smith was required to return the stock if and when his 
employment relationship terminated. 
In the trial court and the Court of Appeals, Mr. Smith 
contended a consulting agreement, entered into in early 1984, was 
wrongfully terminated and the 11,945 shares properly fit within 
the measure of damages to which he was entitled for the wrongful 
termination. In contrast, Rocky Mountain Helicopters contended 
the consulting agreement was not wrongfully terminated and even 
if it were wrongfully terminated, the 11,945 shares of stock did 
not fit within the appropriate measure of damages. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Following trial, the trial court concluded the consulting 
agreement had, in fact, been wrongfully terminated as it related 
to Mr. Smith's right to certain gasoline and insurance benefits. 
Based upon that conclusion, the trial court awarded to Mr. Smith 
damages for a gasoline benefit and medical and insurance expenses 
to which Mr. Smith was entitled under the agreement. However, 
despite Mr. Smith's prayer, the court refused to award 
compensation for consulting services at the rate of $275.00 per 
day or $137.50 per half-day, because Mr. Smith did not work under 
the consulting agreement and, furthermore, the agreement had no 
provision providing for a minimum number of workdays.1 
With respect to the stock, the trial court ordered return of 
-
1
-. The Court of Appeals likewise noted "the nature of the 
work Smith agreed to perform under the contract did not require a 
set amount of time each week or month...." (See Opinion P. 5). 
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11,445 s h a r e s of s t ock to Rocky Mountain H e l i c o p t e r s , I n c . s i n c e 
t h e c o n s u l t i n g and a s e p a r a t e escrow agreement provided for t h e 
r e t u r n of t h e s tock in the even t Rocky Mountain was not so ld or a 
p u b l i c or p r i v a t e s a l e of e q u i t y was not e f f e c t e d . The c o u r t 
found the company had not been sold nor had t h e r e been a p u b l i c 
or p r i v a t e s a l e of e q u i t y . Fu r the rmore , t h e c o u r t found t h a t to 
b e l i e v e Mr. Smith c o u l d have s o l d t h e company or e f f e c t e d a 
p u b l i c or p r i v a t e s a l e of e q u i t y w i th in one y e a r , when t h e r e was 
no agreement as to the terms of e i t h e r would be s p e c u l a t i v e . 
F i n a l l y , t h e c o u r t concluded Mr. Smith was e n t i b l e d to own 
500 s h a r e s of s t o c k i s sued to him as a bonus in connec t ion with 
y e a r s of s e r v i c e r e n d e r e d . 
In the Court of Appeals t he t r i a l c o u r t ' s award of damages 
f o r g a s o l i n e , m e d i c a l and i n s u r a n c e b e n e f i t s was a f f i r m e d , 
a l t h o u g h r e d u c e d s l i g h t l y due to t h e i n s u f f i c i e n c y of t h e 
ev idence to suppor t the t r i a l c o u r t ' s award. S i m i l a r l y the t r i a l 
c o u r t ' s o rde r t h a t Mr. Smith was e n t i t l e d to no c o n s u l t i n g fees 
under t h e c o n s u l t i n g agreement was not changed and no change was 
made with r e s p e c t to the t r i a l c o u r t ' s o rde r t h a t Mr. Smith was 
e n t i t l e d t o 500 s h a r e s of s t o c k . However , r e l y i n g upon t h e 
r a t i o n a l e of F leming v . F l e m i n g - F e l t , t h e Cour t of A p p e a l s 
a p p a r e n t l y concluded the t e r m i n a t i o n of t he c o n s u l t i n g agreement 
p reven ted Mr. Smi th ' s per formance , t he r eby e n t i t l i n g him to the 
11,445 s h a r e s of s t o c k . (Opinion P. 5 ) . As a r e s u l t , an o rde r 
r e v e r s i n g the t r i a l c o u r t was e n t e r e d . 
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In t h i s p e t i t i o n , Rocky Mounta in H e l i c o p t e r s c h a l l e n g e s o n l y 
t h a t p o r t i o n of t h e C o u r t of A p p e a l s ' r u l i n g r e v e r s i n g t h e t r i a l 
c o u r t and o r d e r i n g t h a t Mr . S m i t h i s e n t i t l e d t o t h e 1 1 , 4 4 5 
s h a r e s of s t o c k . 
C. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The f o l l o w i n g f a c t s s h o u l d b e c o n s i d e r e d f o r p u r p o s e s o f 
t h i s p e t i t i o n . R e f e r e n c e s a r e t o t h e r e c o r d , t h e o p i n i o n of t h e 
C o u r t of A p p e a l s , o r a s o t h e r w i s e i n d i c a t e d . 
1 . In J a n u a r y of 1 9 8 1 , R i c h a r d S. Smi th e n t e r e d i n t o an 
o r a l employment a r r a n g e m e n t w i t h Rocky M o u n t a i n H e l i c o p t e r s , 
I n c . , t h r o u g h i t s P r e s i d e n t , James B. B u r r . (R. 302 - Op in ion 2 ) . 
2 . In t h e e a r l y p a r t of 1 9 8 2 , Mr. Smi th s u b m i t t e d t o Mr. 
Burr a memorandum d a t e d J a n u a r y 2 2 , 1 9 8 1 , o u t l i n i n g Mr. S m i t h ' s 
a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s o f t h e p a s t y e a r f o r t h e c o m p a n y . In t h e 
memorandum Mr. Smi th made t h e f o l l o w i n g r e q u e s t : 
" I f I w e r e t o a s k f o r and r e c e i v e a c a s h 
bonus f o r t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n s I h a v e made t o 
t h e company of t h e p a s t y e a r , t h e r e would be 
n o t h i n g t o t i e me t o t h e c o m p a n y a n d 
e n c o u r a g e f u r t h e r p e r f o r m a n c e a l o n g t h e same 
l i n e s . A g a i n , a s I h a v e i n d i c a t e d , I am 
w i l l i n g t o make a l o n g - t e r m commitment t o you 
and t h e company. I w o u l d , t h e r e f o r e , l i k e t o 
p r o p o s e an a l t e r n a t i v e t o a c a s h b o n u s . I 
would l i k e t o s u g g e s t t h a t from t h e s t o c k s e t 
a s i d e f o r t h e c o n v e r s i o n o f t h e p r e f e r r e d 
s h a r e s , o r from o t h e r o u t s t a n d i n g s h a r e s t h a t 
m a y b e c o m i n g b a c k t o R o c k y M o u n t a i n 
H e l i c o p t e r s , t h a t you i s s u e t o me an amoun t 
e q u a l t o 10% of t h e o u t s t a n d i n g common 
s h a r e s . . . . " 
(R. 303) 
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3. Stock Certificate No. 103 in the amount of 11,945 
shares was issued to Richard Smith on or about December 7, 1982. 
(R. 304) 
4. The terms and conditions of the issuance, permitted 
Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. to recall the stock represented 
by Certificate No. 103, at no cost, if: (1) Smith resigned as a 
director and employee of the company; (2) Smith was terminated 
for reasonable cause; (3) Smith died; or (4) Smith left the 
company for other reasons; unless prior to one of those events 
Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. was sold or participated in a 
successful public or private offering of its common stock. If 
the company was sold or participated in a successful public or 
private offering of its common stock then the option to call the 
stock would expire. (R. 305) 
5. At the time the disputed shares were issued, Mr. Smith 
was fully aware of the terms and conditions governing the 
issuance of the stock including the right to recall the stock.... 
(R. 305) 
6. During 1983, Mr. Smith negotiated with Offshore 
Logistics for the sale of Rocky Mountain Helicopters and in 
October of 1983, a letter of intent for the sale of Rocky 
Mountain Helicopters to Offshore Logistics was negotiated. The 
transaction was accepted and ratified by Rocky Mountain's Board 
of Directors at a meeting on November 15, 1983. A draft of a 
sale contract for the transfer of Rocky Mountain Helicopters' 
assets was prepared. However, the sale was never consummated, in 
6 
that the final terms of the agreement were never agreed to by the 
parties. Offshore Logistics Inc. reduced and changed its initial 
offer to purchase prior to finalization of the drafted sales 
contract. (R. 305) 
7. Towards the latter part of 1983, and as a result of 
differences regarding corporate policy, a rift arose between Mr. 
Burr and Mr. Smith. (R. 306) 
8. As a result of the major differences between Mr. Smith 
and Mr. Burr, Mr. Smith's position with the company was changed 
by Mr. Burr in a handwritten letter to Mr. Smith. The letter 
stated: "If the present sale proposal fails you will be asked to 
return your shares of stock December 31, 1983." The sale 
proposal to which reference is made in the handwritten letter is 
that sale proposal to Offshore Logistics. (R.306) 
9. In February of 1984, Mr. Burr and Mr. Smith agreed upon 
the terms of a one-year consulting agreement, as set forth in a 
memo drafted by Smith and signed by both. Under the agreement, 
Smith resigned as Vice President of Finance to pursue other 
commitments. However, he agreed to act as a consultant with the 
principal assignment of continuing efforts either to sell the 
company or raise equity capital. The consulting agreement 
provided Smith would receive $275.00 per day or $137.50 per half-
day for time spent rendering services to the company. In 
addition the agreement stated Rocky Mountain and Smith would 
mutually target 8 (eight) days a month, based upon Smith's 
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availability and the work requirements of Rocky Mountain. (R. 
306, Opinion P. 3, and Exhibit 13) 
10. As part of the consulting agreement and pursuant to a 
separate escrow agreement, Smith agreed to place stock 
certificate number 103 for 11,945 shares in escrow. Both the 
consulting and escrow agreements provided that if the company 
sold or there were a public or private sale of equity for the 
company within one year, or if there were any negotiations for 
such a sale of equity at the end of the year which subsequently 
resulted in the sale of the company or any equity thereof, the 
stock would return to Smith. If there were no such sale within 
the year or negotiations which resulted in such a sale the stock 
would return to Rocky Mountain. (R. 308, Opinion P. 3, and 
Exhibits 13 and 14) 
11. At no time during the one-year period of the consulting 
and escrow agreements did Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. sell 
any of its stock or assets nor did it participate in any public 
or private sale of its stock or the stock of any subsidiary. (R. 
308) 
12. Mr. Smith's consulting agreement was terminated by Mr. 
Burr for and in behalf of the company on April 23, 1984. (R. 
309) 
13. The trial court found the consulting agreement was 
wrongfully terminated as it related to a gasoline benefit and 
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medical and i n s u r a n c e e x p e n s e s . (R. 299) 
14. Mr. Smi th d i d not perform any c o n s u l t i n g s e r v i c e s or 
r ender any s e r v i c e a t a l l for the company under the c o n s u l t i n g 
agreement . (R. 310) 
1 5 . Mr. S m i t h and Mr. B u r r , f o r and on b e h a l f of t h e 
company, had not agreed upon any s p e c i f i c p a r a m e t e r s f o r t h e 
s e l l i n g of the company or any s p e c i f i c pa rame te r s for a d d i t i o n a l 
i n fus ion of c a p i t a l i n to t h e company. For t h e [ t r i a l ] c o u r t to 
e s t a b l i s h such p a r a m e t e r s would be h i g h l y s p e c u l a t i v e and i t 
would be even more s p e c u l a t i v e on the p a r t of t h e [ t r i a l ] c o u r t 
t o d e t e r m i n e t h a t Mr. Smith c o u l d have p e r f o r m e d , g i v e n the 
chance he b e l i e v e d he was p r e v e n t e d , by Bur r , from h a v i n g . (R. 
310) 
16. Mr. S m i t h ' s t e r m i n a t i o n by B u r r , d id not comple te ly 
f r u s t r a t e and p reven t Mr. Smith from f i n d i n g a buye r f o r t h e 
company wi th in the one-year t ime p e r i o d . (R. 310) 
17. None of t h e f o r e g o i n g f a c t s , a s found by the t r i a l 
c o u r t , were cha l l enged by Mr. Smith on a p p e a l , nor were any of 
t h e f o r e g o i n g f a c t s f o u n d , by t h e C o u r t of A p p e a l s , t o be 
u n s u p p o r t a b l e based upon i n s u f f i c i e n c y of t h e e v i d e n c e . (See 
Court of Appeals op in ion) . 
2 T h i s c o u r t should note the t r i a l c o u r t made no f ind ing 
t h a t t h e e s c r o w a g r e e m e n t was t e r m i n a t e d , w r o n g f u l l y o r 
o t h e r w i s e . 
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VI, ARGUMENT 
A, POINT I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS RELIANCE ON FLEMING V, 
FLEMING-FELT IS UNJUSTIFIED IN LIGHT OF THE 
TRIAL COURTfS FINDINGS OF FACT. 
At page five of its opinion, the Court of Appeals, relying 
upon Fleming v. Fleming-Felt Company, 7 Utah 2d 293, 323 P.2d 
712, 716 (1958), concludes "A substantial breach by one party, 
which prevents the other party from performing, excuses the other 
party from further performance and allows him to recover damages 
for the breach." 
The Fl em ing decision sets forth good law. Professor 
Williston has stated: 
The principle that prevention by one party 
excuses performance by the other, both of a 
condition and of a promise, may be laid down 
broadly for all cases. This statement is 
frequently quoted. The condition is excused 
because the promisor has caused the non-
performance of the condition. 
Williston on Contracts, Third Ed. Section 677, at 231. In other 
words, the condition or promise is excused because the breach 
prevented performance of the condition or promise. 
In Fleming, "the finding was made that notwithstanding the 
fact that, 'plaintiff [Fleming] kept or offered to keep and to 
perform all of the provisions of said agreement' the Defendants 
'refused to permit Plaintiff to carry out his duties as general 
manager...' and terminated his status as such, 'without any 
reason or cause, provocation or excuse and [his duties] were 
wrongfully transferred...to...Joseph H. Felt.'" Fleming at 716. 
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In t h i s a c t i o n , i t i s c l e a r t h e c o n d i t i o n upon which Mr. 
S m i t h ' s r i g h t t o t h e s t o c k d e p e n d e d , a s o u t l i n e d i n b o t h t h e 
c o n s u l t i n g and e s c r o w a g r e e m e n t s , was t h e s a l e of Rocky Mounta in 
H e l i c o p t e r s , I n c . or i t s p a r t i c i p a t i o n in any p u b l i c or p r i v a t e 
s a l e of i t s s t o c k o r t h e s t o c k of any s u b s i d i a r y w i t h i n one y e a r . 
I f t h e c o n d i t i o n were n o t m e t , Rocky M o u n t a i n H e l i c o p t e r s was 
e n t i t l e d t o t h e s t o c k , u n l e s s Mr. S m i t h c o u l d p r o v e Rocky 
Moun ta in c a u s e d t h e n o n - p e r f o r m a n c e of t h e c o n d i t i o n . 
As n o t e d a b o v e , i n F l e m i n g , t h e t r i a l c o u r t s p e c i f i c a l l y 
found t h e p e r f o r m a n c e of a c o n d i t i o n o r a p r o m i s e w a s , in f a c t , 
p r e v e n t e d by t h e D e f e n d a n t . In t h i s a c t i o n no such f i n d i n g was 
m a d e . On t h e c o n t r a r y , i n t h i s a c t i o n , t h e t r i a l c o u r t 
s p e c i f i c a l l y found " [Mr . S m i t h ' s ] t e r m i n a t i o n by B u r r , d i d n o t 
c o m p l e t e l y f r u s t r a t e and p r e v e n t [Mr. Smi th ] from f i n d i n g a b u y e r 
f o r t h e company w i t h i n t h e 1 (one) y e a r t i m e p e r i o d . " (R. 3 1 0 ) . 
Whi l e t h e F leming law i s , i n f a c t , good l a w , i t s a p p l i c a t i o n 
t o t h i s a c t i o n i s u n j u s t i f i e d i n l i g h t of t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s 
f i n d i n g s of f a c t . 
B. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THE FLEMING RATIONALE 
IS CONTROLLING 
STOCK AWARDED 
APPEALS DO NOT 
IN 
TO 
THIS 
MR. 
ACTION, 
SMITH 
1
 FIT WITHIN 
BY 
THE 
THE 
THE 
SHARES 
COURT 
OF 
OF 
! APPROPRIATE 
MEASURE OF DAMAGES. 
R e l y i n g upon Young E l e c . S ign Co. v . U n i t e d S t a n d a r d West 
I n c . , 7 5 5 P . 2d 1 6 2 , 164 ( U t a h 1 9 8 8 ) , t h e C o u r t o f A p p e a l s 
d e s c r i b e s t h e m e a s u r e o f d a m a g e s a s " t h e amount n e c e s s a r y t o 
p l a c e t h e n o n - b r e a c h i n g p a r t y in a s good a p o s i t i o n a s i f t h e 
c o n t r a c t had b e e n p e r f o r m e d . " ( O p i n i o n P . 5 ) . T h e r e a f t e r t h e 
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Court of Appeals appears simply to assume full performance under 
the consulting agreement would have resulted in return of the 
stock to Mr. Smith. The Court of Appeals1 assumption is not 
justified by the findings of fact and conclusions of lawf or the 
evidence introduced at trial. 
In Fleming, the Supreme Court, after concluding a foundation 
for excusing the Plaintiff's performance and awarding him damages 
for breach of contract had been laid, considered the question of 
just what damage the Plaintiff was entitled to. In its 
discussion, it is evident the Supreme Court allowed those damages 
for which there was adequate proof and disallowed damages for 
which there was no proof. Fleming at 716. Clearly, it is the 
Plaintiff's burden to prove the damages suffered as a result of 
the breach. In prevention of performance cases, the proof 
required is proof that the condition on which the plaintiff's 
rights depended would have occurred or been performed, but for 
the prevention of performance. Professor Corbin states: 
One who sues for damages, alleging as a 
breach the prevention or hindrance by the 
other party must prove that the condition on 
which his rights depended would have occurred 
or been performed but for the prevention or 
hindrance.^ if his performance would not 
have been rendered anyway, he has not been 
harmed by the alleged prevention or 
-*• In support of his position, Professor Corbin relies upon 
Cone v. Pedersen, 131 Conn. 374, 40 A.2d 274, 276 (1944). In 
Cone, the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut concluded that 
although the defendant had obviously rendered impossible the 
plaintiff's performance, the absence of a finding that the 
plaintiff, a real estate broker, would have become entitled to 
his commission before the listing contract terminated, justified 
the trial court's refusal to award damages. 
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hindrance. The existence of this causal 
relation is a question of fact.... 
4 Corbin on Contracts, Section 947, at 816 (1951). Furthermore, 
the proof required of a Plaintiff must go beyond mere 
speculation. Using a rather appropriate analogy, Professor 
Corbin states: 
...[T]he number of fish that might have been 
caught on a fishing tip is regarded as 
speculative and uncertain; but nevertheless 
there are cases in which profits may be 
measured by the probable catch and a judgment 
rendered therefor. If the Plaintiff merely 
testifies that but for the Defendant's breach 
of duty he would have gone on the trip with 
bait and fishing tackle, no sufficient basis 
for inference is laid. It will be otherwise 
if he proves where he would have fished, his 
skill as a fisherman, and the number of fish 
caught by other fishermen in the same waters 
under- like conditions. 
5 Corbin on Contracts, Section 1022, at 140 (1964). 
With the foregoing in mind and, again assuming arguendo 
Rocky Mountain prevented performance of the condition, we turn to 
the proof presented by Mr. Smith with respect to whether the 
condition would have been performed but for Rocky Mountain's 
prevention. 
At the time of trial, a substantial amount of evidence was 
introduced with respect to negotiations with Offshore Logistics 
for the purchase of Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. In fact, 
the trial court found that on October 18, 1983, a letter of 
intent was executed reflecting the intent of Offshore Logistics 
Inc. to purchase Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. (R. 294 and 
Exhibit 9). The letter of intent was accepted and ratified by 
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the Rocky Mountain Board of Directors at a meeting on November 
15, 1983. (R. 294). Thereafter, a draft of a sale contract for 
the transfer of Rocky Mountain Helicopters1 assets was prepared. 
However, the sale was never consummated because the parties could 
not come to final terms. Offshore Logistics reduced and changed 
its initial offer of purchase prior to finalization of the 
drafted sales contract. (R. 294) 
All discussions with Offshore Logistics Inc. occurred before 
the consulting and escrow agreements were ever contemplated. 
There were no discussions with any prospective purchaser after 
entry of the agreements. For that matter, there was no evidence 
that discussions were entertained with anyone other than Offshore 
Logistics. Mr. Smith acknowledged he made no effort to sell, the 
company after termination of the consulting agreement, because he 
believed he would not be paid for his efforts. (T. 128). Does 
Mr. Smith forget that if a sale or equity offering occurred he 
stood to gain whatever his 11,945 shares were worth as outlined 
in the escrow agreement? Mr. Smith's only proof of efforts 
subsequent to entry of the consulting agreement was that he was 
"ready to perform," but "was never allowed to work." (T.62) 
That is, Mr. Smith simply put on proof that he "would have gone 
on the trip with bait and fishing tackle." At no time did he 
prove "where he would have fished, his skill as a fisherman, and 
the number of fish caught by other fishermen in the same waters 
under like conditions." 
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Not only did Mr. Smith fail to prove that the condition on 
which his right to the stock depended would have been performed 
but for Rocky Mountain's breach, but also, the proof introduced 
by Mr. Smith at trial resulted in a finding that "[Mr. Smith] and 
Burr, for and on behalf of the company, had not agreed upon any 
specific parameters for the selling of the company or any 
specific parameters for additional infusion of capital into the 
company." (R. 310) The court went on to find "for the court to 
establish such parameters would be highly speculative and it 
would be even more speculative on the part of the court to 
determine that [Mr. Smith] could have performed, given the chance 
he believed he was prevented, by Burr, from having." (R. 310) 
It is abundantly clear the trial court believed an award of 
the 11,445 shares of stock to Mr. Smith, as part of his damages, 
required speculation that, in the opinion of the trial court, was 
unjustifiable. The trial court's refusal to engage in that 
speculation is well supported by the law. Even the most basic 
legal periodicals make it clear: 
.. .[Tlbe rule in both tort and contract 
actions is that a recovery for lost profits 
will be allowed only if their loss is capable 
of being proved, and is proved, with a 
reasonable degree of certainty. No recovery 
can be had for loss of profits which are 
determined to be uncertain, contingent, 
conjectural or speculative. Thus no recovery 
can be had for loss of profits where it is 
uncertain whether any profit at all would 
have been made by the Plaintiff. ...[L]ost 
profits will not be allowed as damages if the 
trier of fact is required to speculate as to 
the fact or amount of profits.... 
22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages, Section 625 (1988). The transcript and 
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record are void of any proof that the condition on which Mr. 
Smith's right to the stock depended would have been performed but 
for Rocky Mountain's breach. Because it was, in the opinion of 
the trial court, uncertain whether the condition upon which Mr. 
Smith's right to the stock depended could have been performed, 
even if full performance under the contract occurred, no recovery 
could or should be had. 
C. THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION IMPROPERLY 
INVADES THE PROVINCE OF THE TRIAL COURT. 
"It needs no citation of authorities that if there is 
substantial evidence to support the judgment of the court below, 
[the Appellate Court] affirra[s]." Leon Glazier and Sons, Inc. v. 
Larsen, 26 Utah 2d 429, 491 P.2d 226, 227 (1971). "In reviewing 
the findings and judgment of the trial court, after trial on the 
merits, [the Appellate] Court must view the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the prevailing party, and the judgment will be 
affirmed where the findings of fact are substan t ia bed by the 
evidence." Sharp v. American Medical Systems, Inc., 671 P.2d 
185, 187 (Utah 1983). "The trial court's proximity to the 
witnesses and its opportunity to hear their testimony and observe 
their demeanor, places it in a far more advantaged position than 
[the Appellate] Court, which must rely on an inanimate record." 
Shioji v. Shioji, 712 P.2d 197, 201 (Utah 1985). As a result, 
the reviewing court, "will accord considerable deference to the 
judgment of the trial court due to its advantaged position and 
will not disturb the action of that court unless the evidence 
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c l e a r l y p r e p o n d e r a t e s to the c o n t r a r y , or the t r i a l c o u r t abuses 
i t s d i s c r e t i o n or m i s a p p l i e s p r i n c i p l e s of l aw." Openshaw v . 
Openshaw, 639 P.2d 177, 178 (Utah 1981) . F i n a l l y , " t h e judgment 
[of the t r i a l c o u r t ] should be s u s t a i n e d if t h e f i n d i n g s suppor t 
i t on any c o r r e c t l e g a l t h e o r y . " Fleming v . F leming-Fe l t Co. , 7 
Utah 2d 293 , 323 P.2d 712, 716 (1958) . 
In i t s o p i n i o n , t h e C o u r t of A p p e a l s a s s e r t s : "By 
wrongful ly t e r m i n a t i n g t h e c o n t r a c t , Rocky Mounta in s t r i p p e d 
Smith of h i s a u t h o r i t y t o b a r g a i n on beha l f of t he company and to 
f ind a buyer for t h e company." (Opinion P . 6 ) . Since the t r i a l 
c o u r t made no s u c h f i n d i n g of f a c t o r c o n c l u s i o n of l a w , 
a p p a r e n t l y the Court of Appeals r e l i e s upon Mr. S m i t h ' s t es t imony 
t h a t "he d id not make f u r t h e r e f f o r t s to s e l l the company because 
he had no a u t h o r i t y to a c t on beha l f of t h e company, b e l i e v e d 
t h a t Rocky Mounta in would no t compensa te him even if he were 
s u c c e s s f u l and could not a f fo rd to spend t ime on a p r o j e c t t h a t 
had no p o s s i b i l i t y of r e m u n e r a t i o n . " (Opinion P . 4 ) . ^ Does the 
Court of Appeals s imply i g n o r e Mr. B u r r ' s t e s t i m o n y " t h a t in 
t e r m i n a t i n g t h e c o n s u l t i n g a g r e e m e n t , he was not t e r m i n a t i n g 
S m i t h ' s a b i l i t y to s e l l t h e company and t h a t he t o l d Smith he was 
f r e e t o c o n t i n u e to t r y t o s e l l t h e company?" (T. 190 and 
Opinion P . 4 ) . Does the Court of A p p e a l s f o r g e t t h a t a s t i l l 
v a l i d escrow agreement promised Mr. Smith compensat ion i f he were 
s u c c e s s f u l ? Does t h e C o u r t of A p p e a l s i g n o r e Mr. S m i t h ' s 
4 The C o u r t of A p p e a l s g i v e s no i n d i c a t i o n a s to what 
p o r t i o n of the t r a n s c r i p t or record i t r e l i e s upon as suppor t for 
i t s c o n c l u s i o n . 
17 
acknowledgement that the termination of the consulting agreement 
did not prevent Mr. Smith from going to Jim Burr with an offer 
from a buyer, nor did it prevent him from asking for financial 
records, and the like, to present to a buyer? (T. 127). 
When reviewed in the light most favorable to Rocky Mountain 
Helicopters (the party who prevailed in the trial court on the 
issue of the disposition of 11,445 shares of stock), there is 
little, if any, question as to the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support the trial court's finding that Rocky Mountain's breach 
did not prevent performance of the condition upon which Mr. 
Smith's right to the stock depended. 
Finally, the Supreme Court should note the briefs filed by 
Mr. Smith do not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support the trial court's findings. Furthermore, the Court of 
Appeals opinion is completely void of any indication that the 
trial court abused its discretion. Nevertheless, an order has 
been entered reversing the trial court's decision with respect to 
the disposition of 11,445 shares of stock. Presumably, the Court 
of Appeals has concluded the trial court misapplied the law to 
the facts as found. It should be apparent from the authorities 
cited herein that the trial court decision is who Leheartedly 
supported by the law. As a result, the Court of Appeals has 
improperly invaded the province of the trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
It seems quite clear the Fleming rationale requires not just 
a breach, but a breach that causes the non-performance of a 
18 
c o n d i t i o n or p r o m i s e , b e f o r e t h e c o n d i t i o n or promise may be 
excused . In t h i s a c t i o n , no f ind ing was made t h a t the wrongful 
t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e c o n s u l t i n g a g r e e m e n t c a u s e d t h e n o n -
performance of the c o n d i t i o n upon which Mr. S m i t h ' s r i g h t to t h e 
s tock depended. Fu r the rmore , t he t r i a l c o u r t s p e c i f i c a l l y found 
the t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e c o n s u l t i n g agreement did not p reven t Mr. 
Smith from performing the c o n d i t i o n upon which h i s r i g h t to the 
s t o c k d e p e n d e d . As a r e s u l t t h e Flem i ng r a t i o n a l e i s 
i n a p p l i c a b l e to t h i s a c t i o n . 
A s s u m i n g a r g u e n d o t h e a p p l i c a b i l i t y of t h e Flem i n g 
r a t i o n a l e , Mr. Smith f a i l e d , a t t r i a l , to prove the 11,445 s h a r e s 
of s t ock f i t w i th in the a p p r o p r i a t e measure of damages. At no 
time was any ev idence in t roduced t h a t Mr. Smith would have been 
e n t i t l e d to the s t o c k , bu t for Rocky Mounta in ' s b r e a c h . Based 
upon Mr. S m i t h ' s e f f o r t s dur ing the two yea r s p reced ing execu t ion 
of the c o n s u l t i n g agreement , t he b e s t guess as to the r e s u l t s of 
h i s e f f o r t s d u r i n g t h e o n e - y e a r p e r i o d of t h e c o n s u l t i n g 
agreement , was t h a t Rocky Mountain would not be s o l d , nor would 
i t engage in a p u b l i c or p r i v a t e o f f e r i n g of i t s s t o c k . As a 
r e s u l t , w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e 1 1 , 4 4 5 s h a r e s , Mr. Smith was not 
damaged by t h e t e r m i n a t i o n . At b e s t , a s no t ed by t h e t r i a l 
c o u r t , i t r e q u i r e s s u b s t a n t i a l s p e c u l a t i o n to c o n c l u d e t h e 
c o n d i t i o n upon which Mr. S m i t h ' s r i g h t to t h e s t o c k d e p e n d e d , 
would have been performed given the o p p o r t u n i t y he be l i eved he 
was d e n i e d . 
F i n a l l y , t h e t r i a l c o u r t i s g iven a g r e a t dea l of d i s c r e t i o n 
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in making findings of fact. To ignore or, in some other fashion, 
discount those findings on appeal, invades the province of the 
trial court. Rocky Mountain respectfully asserts that in 
reversing the trial court's order with respect to the disputed 
shares of stock, the Court of Appeals has improperly invaded the 
province of the trial court. 
Respectfully submitted this /^ day of April, 1989. 
/£k;/-^L 
Robert S. Youngj / 
Attorney for^Se^ition^r 
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correct copies of the above and foregoing Petition of Rocky 
Mountain Helicopters, Inc. for Writ of Certiorari were filed with 
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copies were furnished by mail to Suzanne Benson, Esq., Robert M. 
McDonald, Esq., McDonald & Bullen, American Plaza III, 47 West 
Second South, Suite 450, Salt Lake City, UT 84101 this /— day 
of April, 1989. _ 
*L j£ 
Robert S. Youngj 
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Appendix Exhibit A 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO F£Bf0 
Richard S. Smith, 
Plaintiff, Appellant 
and Cross-Respondent, 
v. 
Rocky Mountain Helicoptersi 
ins!*., a Utah corporation, 
and Executive Escrow Services, 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants, Respondent 
and Cross-Appellant. 
OPINION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 870511-CA 
F I L E D 
FEB 8 1989 
Fourth District, Utah County 
The Honorable Boyd L. Park 
Attorneys: Robert M. McDonald, Suzanne Benson, 
Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Robert S. Young, Provo, for Respondent 
Before Judges Davidson, Garff and Greenwood. 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Richard Smith initiated this action against Rocky 
Mountain Helicopters, Inc., claiming that Rocky Mountain 
improperly terminated his consulting contract. The trial court-
found that Rocky Mountain had improperly terminated the 
contract, and awarded Smith 500 shares of stock, $600 in 
gasoline benefits and $2,699.55 in medical and insurance 
expenses. Smith appeals, asserting the trial court erred in 
refusing to award him an additional 11,445 shares of stock. 
Rocky Mountain cross-appeals, claiming the trial court erred in 
finding that Rocky Mountain wrongfully terminated the contract, 
and in awarding Smith $600 in gasoline benefits, $2,699.55 
medical and insurance expenses, and 500 shares of stock. 
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In January 1981, Smith entered into an oral employment 
arrangement with Rocky Mountain, through its president, James 
B. Burr. Under the arrangement, Smith became Rocky Mountain's 
vice president of finance and was to receive a salary and a 
bonus. Smith's responsibilities included dealing with the 
problems Rocky Mountain was having with one of its creditors, 
renegotiating Rocky Mountain's shareholder relationship, and 
obtaining a buyer for Rocky Mountain. Smith successfully 
restructured the company's financial position, refinanced the 
creditor obligation, and reorganized the company's relationship 
with its shareholders. 
On September 20, 1982, Smith wrote a letter to Burr 
confirming that 11,945 shares of the company's stock would be 
issued to Smith if he completed a transaction whereby preferred 
shareholders would give up their conversion rights. In the 
letter, Smith stated that Rocky Mountain could recall the stock 
if Smith resigned, was terminated with reasonable cause, died, 
or left for other reasons. The letter also stated that if the 
company were sold, or if the company had a successful public or 
private offering, Rocky Mountain's option to recall the stock 
would expire. On December 7, 1982, Smith was issued stock 
certificate number 103 for 11,945 shares of stock. By letter 
dated December 8, 1982, Smith reiterated the company's right to 
recall the stock as set forth in the September 20, 1982 
letter. 
In late 1983, a rift arose between Smith and Burr. On 
November 15, 1983, Rocky Mountain's board of directors passed a 
resolution stating that in consideration of Smith's securing 
releases from preferred shareholders, Smith was issued 11,445 
shares of stock. The board of directors also passed a 
resolution issuing 500 shares of stock to Smith and various 
amounts of stock to other employees under the company's bonus 
plan, in consideration of loyal service and performance. Stock 
certificate number 103, which had been previously issued to 
Smith one year earlier, included both the 500 shares and the 
11,445 shares. 
Also in 1983, Smith began negotiating the sale of Rocky 
Mountain with Offshore Logistics. On November 21, 1983, after 
the rift had arisen between Smith and Burr, Burr sent a 
handwritten memorandum to Smith stating that Smith would no 
longer be an officer of the company but would still have 
authority to represent the company on specific assignments, 
including acquisitions/mergers, corporate planning and 
financing. In addition, the memo stated that Smith would be 
more of a consultant and would be paid $250 per day, plus 
expenses, with a minimum of eight days per month through 
January 1984, at which time the program would be reevaluated. 
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The memo also stated that Smith would receive full insurance 
coverage under the company*s benefit schedule and one of the 
company cars* Finally, the memo stated, "If the present sales 
proposal [with Offshore Logistics] fails, you will be asked to 
return your shares of stock Dec 31, 1983." 
The sales proposal with Offshore Logistics failed. Smith 
contended at trial that the sale failed because Burr told him 
he had decided he did not want to sell the company. Burr, 
however, testified that Offshore Logistics and Rocky Mountain 
did not reach a final agreement. The court found that the sale 
was never consummated because final terms were never agreed 
upon and Offshore Logistics reduced and changed its initial 
offer. 
In February 1984, Burr and Smith agreed upon the terms of 
a new consulting agreement, as set forth in a memo drafted by 
Smith and signed by both. Under the agreement, Smith resigned 
as vice president of finance of Rocky Mountain to pursue other 
commitments. Smith agreed, however, to continue to provide 
consulting services to Rocky Mountain, with the principal 
assignment of attempting to sell the company or raise equity 
capital. The consulting agreement provided that Smith would 
receive $275 per day or $137.50 per half day for time spent 
rendering services to the company* In addition, the agreement 
stated that Rocky Mountain and Smith would target eight work 
days a month, based on Smith's availability and the work 
requirements of Rocky Mountain. As part of the agreement, 
Smith agreed to place stock certificate number 103 for 11,945 
shares in escrow. If the company sold or if Smith obtained 
equity financing within one year, the stock would revert to 
Smith. If no sale occurred, Rocky Mountain would be entitled 
to the stock. The agreement also stated that Smith would 
receive medical and dental insurance, continued life insurance, 
$1,000 spousal travel and 50 gallons of gasoline per month. 
Smith and Burr also signed an escrow agreement which contained 
the same conditions as the consulting agreement with regard to 
stock certificate number 103. The escrow agreement also stated 
that it replaced the agreements of September 20 and December 8, 
1982. 
In April 1984, Rocky Mountain initiated an unrelated 
lawsuit against Smith which was settled shortly after it was 
filed. By letter dated April 23, 1984, Burr terminated the 
consulting agreement, stating that the termination was because 
of SmitlTs "lack of availability as a result of out-of-town 
commitments." On February 15, 1985, Smith initiated this 
action against Rocky Mountain for wrongful termination. From 
February 15, 1984 to February 15, 1985, Rocky Mountain did not 
sell any of its stock or assets or participate in a public or 
private offering of its stock. 
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At trial, Burr testified that the consulting agreement 
was terminated due to Smith's unavailability. Burr stated that 
he called Smith between five and ten times and was unable to 
reach him. Burr also testified that in terminating the 
consulting agreement, he was not terminating Smith's ability to 
sell the company and that he told Smith he was free to continue 
to try to sell the company. In contrast. Smith testified that 
he was available and willing to work for Rocky Mountain and 
that he would have received telephone messages if Burr had 
attempted to contact him. He also stated that he did not make 
further efforts to sell the company because he had no authority 
to act on behalf of the company, believed that Rocky Mountain 
would not compensate him even if he were successful, and could 
not afford to spend time on a project which had no possibility 
of remuneration. 
With regard to the gasoline benefit, Smith's attorney 
proffered that Smith was entitled to $600, but after 
questioning Smith, revised the proffer to $400 or $450. 
Smith's attorney also proffered that Smith expended $708.15 for 
medical insurance, $1,111.40 for actual expenses and $850 for 
dental care. 
The court found that Smith's termination did not 
completely frustrate and prevent him from finding a buyer for 
the company within one year. The court concluded that the 
consulting agreement was wrongfully terminated and that Smith 
was entitled to $600 gasoline benefit and $2,699.55 for medical 
and insurance expenses. The court also concluded that Smith 
was entitled to the 500 shares of stock, because they were 
issued as a bonus and were not, therefore, subject to the 
recall provisions of the letter agreements or the consulting 
and escrow agreements. The court found that Rocky Mountain was 
entitled to return of the 11,445 shares of stock because the 
company was not sold or the subject of a private or public 
offering. 
On appeal, Smith claims that the trial court's conclusion 
that the contract was wrongfully terminated is inconsistent 
with the court's finding that Rocky Mountain is entitled to the> 
11,445 shares of stock. Rocky Mountain, however, claims that 
the trial court's determination of wrongful termination is 
incorrect as a matter of law because the contract was an 
employment contract terminable at the will of either party. 
Rocky Mountain also claims that even if the contract was not 
terminable at will, the termination was for just cause, and 
that the court erred in awarding Smith the 500 shares and in 
the amounts of other damages awarded. 
870511-CA 4 
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The court's findings indicate that the consulting 
agreement was coterminus with the escrow agreement/ both to end 
after one year. In Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790, 792 
(Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court held that 
in the absence of some further express or 
implied stipulation as to the duration of 
the employment or of a good consideration 
in addition to the services contracted to 
be rendered, the contract is no more than 
an indefinite general hiring which is 
terminable at the will of either party. 
Since the contract in this case was to last for one year, it 
had a specific duration, and thus, was not a terminable at will 
contract. 
The next issue raised is whether the trial court erred in 
finding that Rocky Mountain wrongfully terminated the contract, 
thus totally breaching the contract. In this case, the 
contract explicitly stated that Smith would be free to perform 
consulting work for other companies and that Smith and Rocky 
Mountain would "target eight days a month of work [for Rocky 
Mountain] based on [Smith's] availability concurrent with the 
work requirements of [Rocky Mountain]." Smith's principal 
assignment was to obtain a buyer for the company or equity 
financing. Burr's letter to Smith terminating the consulting 
contract effective May 1, 1984 stated that the termination was 
because of Smith's unavailability. However, the contract 
clearly anticipates that Smith's ability to perform work for 
Rocky Mountain would be limited by his availability. In 
addition, the nature of the work Smith agreed to perform under 
the contract did not require a set amount of time each week or 
month, and Smith testified that he was available to provide 
consulting services. Therefore, because Rocky Mountain's 
termination of the contract was for circumstances contemplated 
by the contract and the court apparently believed Smith's 
testimony as to his availability rather than Burr's, the 
termination constituted a breach of the parties' contract• 
We next consider whether Smith is entitled to retain the 
11,445 shares of stock as part of his damages for breach of 
contract. A substantial breach by one party, which prevents 
the other party from performing, excuses the other party from 
further performance and allows him to recover damages for the 
breach. Fleming v. Flemino-Felt Co., 7 Utah 2d 293, 323 P.2d 
712, 716 (1958). Generally, damages for breach of contract are 
measured by the lost benefit of the bargain, "the amount 
necessary to place the nonbreaching party in as good a position 
as if the contract had been performed.- Young Elec. Sign Co. 
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v- United Standard West, Inc.. 755 P.2d 162, 164 (Utah 1988) 
(quoting Alexander v. Brown. 646 P.2d 692, 695 (Utah 1982)). 
In this case, the parties1 consulting agreement provided 
that Smith would place stock certificate number 103 for 11,945 
shares of stock in escrow, on the condition that the stock 
would be returned to Smith if the company were sold within one 
year or if there were any negotiations ongoing for such a sale 
at the end of the year which resulted in the sale of the 
company. If no sale occurred, the stock would be returned to 
the company. 
By wrongfully terminating the contract, Rocky Mountain 
stripped Smith of his authority to bargain on behalf of the 
company and to find a buyer for the company. "In the case of a 
bilateral contract for an agreed exchange of performances, a 
repudiation of his duty by one of the parties terminates the 
duty of the other," who may then sue for damages• 4 Corbin on 
Contracts § 975, at 916 (4th ed. 1972). Therefore, Rocky 
Mountain's termination of Smith excused Smith from performing 
his obligations under the contract.1 Thus, Smith was 
entitled to the 11,445 shares of stock to place him in the 
position he would have occupied but for Rocky Mountain9s 
breach. This conclusion likewise justifies retention of the 
500 shares the court awarded to Smith. 
Finally, we consider whether the trial court erred in 
awarding Smith $600 in gasoline benefits and $2,966.55 in 
medical benefits. An award of damages "must be supported by 
proof upon which reasonable minds acting fairly thereon could 
believe that it is more probable than not, that damage was 
actually suffered." Jamison v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 559 
P.2d 958, 961-62 (Utah 1977). At trial, Smith's attorney 
proffered that Smith was entitled to $450 in gasoline benefits 
after questioning Smith about his gasoline expenses. Because 
the evidence does not support the court's award of $600, the 
award of gasoline benefits must be revised to $450. In 
addition, Smith1s attorney proffered that Smith expended 
$708.15 for medical insurance, $1,111.40 in actual expenses and 
1. The trial court found that Rocky Mountains termination of 
Smith did not completely frustrate Smith's ability to sell the 
company. However, as Smith testified, he no longer had the . 
authority to negotiate on behalf of the company, and if he had 
continued to search for a buyer, he would have had no guarantee 
that he would be compensated. Therefore, while the trial 
courtfs finding is presumed to be correct, it does not obviate 
Smith1s right to damages because his failure to further perform 
was excused by Rocky Mountain's breach. 
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$850 in dental care. Those figures total $2,669.55 not 
$2/966.55, the amount the trial court awarded. Therefore, the 
medical benefits award must be revised to $2,669.55. 
All other issues raised are without merit. Reversed and 
remanded for entry of an order in accordance with this opinion, 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
JIWIW. GarffTJudge 
A ^ 
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This cause having been heretofore argued and submitted, and the 
Court being sufficiently advised in the premises, it is now 
ordered, adjudged and decreed that the judgment of the trial 
court herein be, and the same is, reversed and remanded for 
further proceedings in accordance with the views expressed in 
the opinion filed herein. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO—— 
iOS— 
MsryT Nocnan 
Clerk of %T& Court 
Utan Court of Appeals 
Richard S. Smith, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
and Cross-Respondent, 
v. 
Rocky Mountain PeUcopterSf mc t, 
a Utah corporation, and Executive 
Escrow Services, a Utah corporation, 
Defendants, Respondents, 
and Cross-Appellant. 
Before Judges Bench, Davidson and Jackson* 
ORDER 
DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Court of Appeals No. 870511-CA 
RECEIVED 
«AR fl 8 1989 
kn'L 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon 
Respondent and Cross-Appellant's Petition for 
Rehearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Rehearing is 
denied. 
DATED this 6th day of March, 1989. 
FOR THE COURT 
, Clerk o Y T./ NOONAN FThe Court 
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Appendix Exh ib i t C 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
RICHARD S. SMITH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS, 
INC., a Utah corporation, and 
EXECUTIVE ESCROW SERVICES, a 
Utah corporation, 
D e f e n d a n t . 
(tlase Number 68775 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
******** 
This matter came on duly and regularly before the court 
sitting without a jury on the 11th day of March, 1987, beginning 
at 9:00 a.m.. The plaintiff appeared in person and was 
represented by Frederick A. Jackman, Esq.. The defendant Rocky 
Mountain Helicopters, Inc. appeared through James B. Burr, 
president and chairman of the Board of Directors and was 
represented by Robert S. Young, Esq.. Defendant Executive Escrow 
Services did not appear and was not represented by an attorney, 
the parties stipulating that this defendant had no real interest 
in the outcome of the law suit and was merely a holder of shares 
of stock of Rocky Mountain helicopters, Inc. which were in 
dispute as to ownership. The court heard the evidence, received 
Exhibits #1-16 and 20-28 and having heard the argument of counsel 
and being fully advised in the premises, now finds and concludes 
as follows: 
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1. In approximately January of 1981, the plaintiff, 
Richard S. Smith, was employed by Rocky Mountain Helicopters, 
Inc., (Herein sometimes referred to as the Company) through James 
B. Burr, its president, to act in the capacity of vice president 
of finance (Stipulated). 
2. Under the employment arrangement, the plaintiff was 
to receive a salary and contingent upon the Company's 
profitability, a bonus equal to twenty percent (20%) of that 
salary (Stipulated). 
3. At the time that plaintiff was hired, Rocky 
Mountain Helicopters was experiencing difficulty with one of its 
creditors, Teachers Insurance Annuity Fund; the company was also 
attempting to renegotiate the relationship it had with its 
preferred shareholders; and it was interested in obtaining a 
buyer for the company. Plaintiff's responsibilities included 
dealing with these particular problems. 
4. Plaintiff was successful in his employment in the 
following areas: (1) Restructuring the Company's financial 
position by the adoption of certain accounting procedures 
suggested by the plaintiff; (2) Refinancing the Teachers 
Insurance Fund obligation with a cash discount of approximately 
seven hundred and fifty thousand dollars ($750,000.00) to the 
Company; (3) Restructuring the Company's arrangement with its 
preferred shareholders at less cost to the Company and its common 
shareholders than had theretofore been provided for in other 
alternatives previously considered by the Company; (4) In 
securing releases from the preferred shareholders concerning 
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their rights of conversion and their right to elect the majority 
of the board of directors because of certain defaults on the part 
of the Company that were then in existence. 
5. Plaintiff submitted to Mr. Burr a memorandum dated 
January 27, 1981, outlining plaintiff's accomplishments of the 
past year for the Company. Plaintiff further made the following 
request: 
"If I were to ask for, and receive, a cash bonus for 
the contributions I have made to the Company of the 
past year, there would be nothing to tie me to the 
Company and to encourage further performance along the 
same lines* Again, as I have indicated I am willing to 
make a long term commitment to you and to the Company. 
I would, therefore, like to propose an alternative to a 
cash bonus. I would like to suggest that from the 
stock set aside for the conversion of the Preferred 
Shares, or from other outstanding share that may be 
coming back to Rocky Mountain Helicopters, that you 
issue to me an amount equal to 10% of the outstanding 
common shares. . ." (See Exhibit #2). 
Plaintiff alleges Mr. Burr agreed to give him a cash bonus for 
the work performed and accomplishments achieved as outlined in 
Exhibit #2 and in paragraph 4 of this Memorandum Decision. Mr. 
Burr alleges he never agreed to give plaintiff a cash bonus for 
his work and accomplishments, and further alleges the Company was 
not profitable from the standpoint of the cost of flying 
helicopters was more than the income received. 
6. Plaintiff initially received seven thousand sixty-
six (7,066) shares which were obtained by the Company pursuant to 
the redemption of stock from Gary Fitzgerald, which shares were 
issued to him without any conditions. 
7. Plaintiff was issued 500 shares of the Company 
under a stock bonus plan for loyal services and performance tc 
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the Company. Other key employees received stock in the Company 
as a bonus as well. The stock bonus was calculated on years of 
service. (See Exhibit #6 and 23). 
8. Plaintiff was issued 11,945 shares of stock in the 
Company (this included the 500 shares referred to in paragraph 7 
above) for securing releases by the preferred stockholders of 
their stock conversion rights. Such issue was in confirmation of 
discussions and agreements in October 1982 with members of the 
Board. (See Exhibit #7 and 23). The said shares of the Company 
were subject to recall by the Company as provided by letters of 
understanding signed by the plaintiff dated September 20, 1982, 
and December 8, 1982. (See Exhibit #3, 4, and 5). 
9. A stock certificate No. 103 in the amount of eleven 
thousand nine hundred and forty-five (11,945) shares was issued 
to Richard S. Smith on or about December 7, 1982 (Stipulated). 
10. The terms and conditions of the letters dated 
September 20, 1982, and December 8, 1982, permitted Rocky 
Mountain Helicopters, Inc., to recall the stock at no cost if 1) 
smith resigned as a director and employee of the company; 2) 
Smith was terminated for reasonable cause; 3) Smith died; or 4) 
Smith left the company for other reasons; unless prior to one of 
those events Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc., was sold or 
participated in a successful public or private offering of its 
common stock. If the Company was sold or participated in a 
successful public or private offering of its common stock then 
the option to call the stock would expire. (Stipulated) (See 
Exhibits # 3 , 4 , and 5). 
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11. At the time the disputed shares were issued, 
plaintiff was fully aware of the terms and conditions governing 
the issuance of the stock (particularly 11,449 shares), including 
the right to recall the stock as outlined in the letter of 
September 20, 1982 (Stipulated). 
12. All of the transactions involving the issuance of 
stock were approved by Rocky Mountain Helicopter, Inc.'s board of 
directors at a board of directors meeting occurring on November 
15, 1983 (Stipulated). 
13. During 1983, Mr. Smith negotiated with offshore 
Logistics for the sale of Rocky Mountain helicopters and in 
October of 1983, a letter of intent for the sale of Rocky 
Mountain Helicopters to Offshore Logistics was negotiated, and 
was accepted and ratified by the board of directors at a meeting 
on November 15, 1983. A draft of a sale contract for the 
transfer of Rocky Mountain Helicopters1 assets were prepared. 
However, the sale was never consummated in that the final terms 
of the agreement were never agreed to by the parties. Offshore 
Logistics, Inc. reduced and changed its initial offer of purchase 
prior to finalization of the drafted sales contract. 
14. Towards the latter part of 1983, and as a result 
of differences regarding corporate policy, a rift arose between 
Mr. Burr and plaintiff (Stipulated). 
15. As a result of the major differences between the 
plaintiff and Burr, plaintiff's position with the Company was 
changed by Burr in a handwritten letter to plaintiff. Burr, in 
said handwritten letter, stated: "If the present sale proposal 
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fails, you will be asked to return your shares of stock December 
31, 1983". (See Exhibit #11). The sale proposal was to Offshore 
Logistics. 
16. Plaintiff and the Company, through James Burr, 
agreed to compromise their differences in which plaintiff would 
be retained by Rocky Mountain Helicopters for a period of one 
year under a consulting agreement with the principal assignment 
of plaintiff to sell the company or raise equity funding. 
Plaintiff agreed to place his eleven thousand nine hundred and 
forty-five (11,945) shares of stock (Certificate #103) in escrow. 
This agreement was memorialized in a writing dated February 15, 
1984, which consisted of a consulting agreement prepared by 
plaintiff and Mr. Burr and an escrow agreement prepared by Mr. 
Burr's attorney, Jerry Thorn. The actual date of signing of the 
agreement was February 27, 1984. (See Exhibits # 13 and 14). 
17. In the consulting agreement, plaintiff promised to 
be a consultant for Rocky Mountain helicopter and receive the 
benefit of having the opportunity to continue his efforts either 
to sell Rocky Mountain Helicopters or to arrange for an equity 
injection of funds into Rocky Mountain Helicopters through a 
public or private placement of stock. The contract provided that 
for his consulting services he would receive consideration in the 
amount of two hundred seventy-five dollars ($275.00) per day or 
one hundred thirty-seven dollars and fifty cents ($137.50) per 
half day for the time plaintiff spent rendering consulting 
services to the Company. Plaintiff was to receive the benefit of 
having the continuation of the medical/dental insurance. 
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Plaintiff was to receive the benefit of continued life insurance 
and associated health insurance. Plaintiff would receive the 
benefit of $1,000.00 spousal travel upon approval. Plaintiff was 
to^receive the benefit of having his income tax returns prepared 
for 1983. Plaintiff was to receive the benefit of being able to 
use the Xerox and Watts lines for personal use. Plaintiff was to 
receive the benefit of using the office of Rocky Mountain 
Helicopters to work on his other activities. The consulting 
agreement provided for an exchange of accrued vacation, sick time 
and separation benefits in return for an Oldsmobile automobile 
along with four new tires for the automobile. The consulting 
agreement provided for the exchange of plaintiff's receivable 
from Windgate Oil Smith for a Suburban automobile. Plaintiff was 
to receive the benefit of fifty (50) gallons of gasoline per 
month. 
18. The Escrow Agreement (dated February 27, 1984), 
provides that if during the one (1) year period: 
"ROCKY MOUNTAIN HELICOPTER, INC. is sold to a third 
party or parties, either by virtue of a majority of its 
assets being purchased or, in the alternative, any 
public or private sale of its stock or the stock of any 
subsidiary takes place, then and in that event, the 
shares of stock represented by the certificates 
deposited herewith will be returned to Richard S. 
Smith? provided that if any negotiations for sale of 
assets of stock have begun prior jto the expiration of 
one (1) year from the date hereof that result in such a 
sale, then and in that event, such sale will be 
considered to have occurred within the one (1) year 
previously mentioned herein. Provided further that in 
the event the conditions described herein do not occur 
within one (1) year from the date of this Agreement 
then .the stock represented by the Certificate No. 
will be returned to ROCKY MOUNTAIN HELICOPTER, INC." 
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The Escrow Agreement further stated it replaced the agreements of 
September 20, 1982, and December 8, 1982- (See Exhibit #14). 
19. At no time during the one year period of the 
Escrow Agreement did Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. sell any of 
its stock or assets nor did it participate in any public or 
private sale of its stock or the stock of any subsidiary. 
20. Plaintiff confirmed in the consulting agreement 
dated February 15, 1984, his resignation as "chief financial 
officer, vice president — finance, and treasurer of Rocky 
Mountain Helicopters, Inc., as well as any other positions of 
officership which I might hold with any subsidiary companies of 
Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc." The resignation had effect 
from January 1, 1984 (Stipulated). 
21. On or about March 2, 1984, the plaintiff resigned 
as a director of Rocky Mountain helicopters, Inc. (Stipulated). 
22. Plaintiff's testimony and position is that the 
language of the Escrow Agreement (Exhibit #14) was intended to 
eliminate the right of recall of plaintiff's stock, as provided 
for in the letter agreements of September 20 and December 8, 
1982. (Exhibits # 3 and 4). That this change was discussed by 
fhe* 
4*fe plaintiff with attorney Jerry Thorn. 
23. Burr's testimony and the position of defendant 
Company is that the language of the Escrow Agreement (Exhibit 
#14) did not, nor was it ever intended, to eliminate the right of 
recall of plaintiff's stock as provided for in the letter 
agreements of September 20 and December 8, 1982. (Exhibits # 3 
and 4). That there was never any such discussion between 
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plaintiff and Burr, nor any such discussion between Burr and 
attorney Jerry Thorn. 
24. On April 16, 1984, Rocky Mountain Helicopters sued 
plaintiff. This law suit was settled on or about April 19, 1984. 
Based on this law suite and other factors, the relationship 
between Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Jim Burr, and plaintiff was 
left strained. 
25. Plaintiff's consulting agreement was terminated by 
Burr for and in behalf of the Company on April 23, 1984. (See 
Exhibit #20). 
26. Burr contends plaintiff's consulting agreement was 
terminated because of plaintiff's lack of availability. 
Plaintiff did not perform any consulting services or render any 
service at all for the company under the consulting agreement. 
27. Plaintiff contends his consulting agreement was 
terminated because of the settlement of the lawsuit referred to 
is paragraph #24 herein and further to preclude plaintiff from 
trying to either sell the Company or add additional equity to the 
Company. 
28. Plaintiff and Burr for and on behalf of the 
Company, had not agreed upon any specific parameters for the 
selling of the Company or *M> specific parameters for additional 
infusion of capital into the Company. F6r the court to establish 
such parameters would be highly speculative and it would be even 
more speculative on the part of the court to determine that 
plaintiff could have performed, given the chance he believe he 
was prevented by Burr from having. 
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29. The court does not find that the plaintiff was 
completely frustrated and prevented from finding a buyer for the 
company within the one (1) year time period by Burr. 
Based on the foregoing the court concludes as follows: 
1. Plaintiff's consulting agreement was wrongfully 
terminated as it relates to the following items, and as such 
plaintiff is entitled to a judgment against the defendant Company 
as follows: 
a. $600.00 for a gasoline benefit. 
b. $2,699.55 for medical and insurance expenses of 
the plaintiff incurred during the term of the consulting 
agreement. 
2. Plaintiff is not entitled to any compensation for 
work days, inasmuch as he did not work, nor was there an absolute 
provision providing a minimum of work days. Defendant Company 
could have provided as many as eight days a month or no days a 
month. 
3. Defendant Company is entitled to the return of 
9,445 shares of Company stock, inasmuch as the Consulting 
Agreement and the Escrow Agreement provided for the return of 
stock in the event the Company was not sold or a public or 
private sale of equity was not effected. The Company was not 
sold nor was there a public or private sale of equity. To 
believe the plaintiff could have sold the Company or effected a 
public or private sale of equity within one year, when there was 
no agreement as to the terms of either would be speculative. 
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4. Plaintiff is entitled to own the 500 shares of 
Company stock issued to him as a bonus. Since the Company 
elected to issue such shares as a stock bonus, such shares so 
issued should not be a part of the stock issued under the call 
provisions of the letter agreements or the provisions of the 
consulting agreement and the escrow agreement• 
5. Counsel for the defendant is directed to prepare 
and serve pursuant to Rule 2.9 appropriate Findings, Conclusions 
and Order in accordance with the foregoing. 
DATED at Provo, Utah, this /3^day of May, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
^ B C Y D X. PARK, JUDGE 
cc: Frederick A. Jackman, Esq. 
Robert S. Young, Esq. 
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Appendix Exhibit B 
ROBERT S. YOUNG 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS, INC. 
Post Office Box 1337 
Provo, UT 84603 
801-375-1124 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD S. SMITH, ) 
Plaintiff, ) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. ) 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS, ) Civil No. 685775 
INC., a Utah corporation, and ) 
EXECUTIVE ESCROW SERVICES, a ) 
Utah corporation, ) 
Defendants. ) 
Trial of this matter occurred on the 11th day of May, 1987, 
commencing at 9:00 AM. The Plaintiff appeared in person and was 
represented by Frederick A. Jackman, Esq. The Defendant, ROCKY 
MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS, INC., appeared through James B. Burr, 
President and Chairman of the Board of Directors, and was 
represented by Robert S. Young, Esq. Defendant, EXECUTIVE ESCROW 
SERVICES, did not appear and was not represented by an attorney, 
the other parties stipulating that said Defendant had no real 
interest in the outcome of the lawsuit and was merely a holder of 
shares of stock of ROCKY MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS, INC. which were in 
dispute as to ownership. 
The Court having heard the evidence, received exhibits 
numbered 1 (one) through 16 (sixteen) apd 20 (twenty) through 28 
-1-
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(twenty-eight) , heard the argument of counsel and being otherwise 
fully advised in the premises hereby enters these: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. In approximately January of 1981f the Plaintiff, 
RICHARD S. SMITH, was employed by ROCKY MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS, 
INC., (herein sometimes referred to as the Company), through 
James B. Burr, its President, to act in the capacity of Vice 
President of Finance. (Stipulated) 
2. Under the employment arrangement, the Plaintiff was to 
receive a salary and contingent upon the Company's profitability, 
a bonus equal to 20% of that salary. (Stipulated) 
3. At the time Plaintiff was hired, ROCKY MOUNTAIN 
HELICOPTERS, INC. was experiencing difficulty with one of its 
creditors, Teachers Annuity Fund. The Company was also 
attempting to renegotiate the relationship it had with its 
preferred shareholders and was interested in obtaining a buyer 
for the Company. Plaintiff's responsibilities included, .-among-
--oUlUl' tilings, dealing with these particular problems. 
4. Plaintiff was successful in his employment in the 
following areas: 
a* Restructuring the Company's financial position by 
the adoption of certain accounting procedures suggested by 
the Plaintiff; 
b. Refinancing the Teachers Insurance Fund obligation 
with a cash discount of approximately $750,000.00 (seven 
hundred fifty thousand dollars) to the Company; 
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c. Restructuring the Company's arrangement with 
preferred shareholders at less cost to the Company apd its 
common shareholders th9n had theretofore been available in 
other alternatives previously considered by the Company; and 
d. Securing releases from the preferred shareholders 
concerning their rights of conversion and their right to 
elect a majority of the Board of Directors due to certain 
defaults on the part of the Company that were then in 
existence, 
5. Plaintiff submitted to Burr, in the early part of 1982r 
a memorandum dated January 27, 1981, outlining Plaintiff's 
accomplishments of the past year for the Company. In the 
memorandum, Plaintiff made the following request: 
"If I were to ask for, and receive, a cash 
bonus for the contributions I have made to 
the Company of the past year, there would 
be nothing to tie me to the Company and to 
encourage further performance along the same 
lines. Again, as I have indicated I am 
willing to make a long term commitment to you 
and to the Company. I would, therefore, like 
to propose an alternative to a cash bonus. I 
would like to suggest that from the stock set 
aside for the conversion of the preferred 
shares, or from other outstanding shares that 
may be coming back to Rocky Mountain Heli-
copters, that you issue to me an amount equal 
to ten percent of the outstanding common 
shares...." (See Exhibit 2) 
Plaintiff alleges Mr. Burr agreed to give him a cash bonus 
for the work performed and accomplishments achieved as outlined 
in Exhibit 2 and paragraph 4 of these Findings. Mr. Burr alleges 
he never agreed to give Plaintiff a cash bonus for his work and 
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accomplishments, M m in IIUAIIJ hpUij
 L-.«^ H F*F M n -<fnTTT altiT 
x^iec ompliahiwaiLji , and furthermore, the Company was not profitable 
from the standpoint of its helicopter operations. The cost of 
flying the helicopters was exceeding the income received* 
6. Plaintiff initially received 7,066 (seven thousand 
sixty-six) shares of stock in the Company. The stock had been 
returned by Gary Fitzgerald and was issued to Plaintiff without 
conditions. 
7. Plaintiff was issued 500 (five hundred) shares of the 
Company under a stock bonus plan for loyal services and 
performance to the Company. Other key employees received stock 
in the Company under the same terms and conditions. The number 
of shares issued was calculated based upon years of service to 
the Company. (See Exhibits 6 and 23) 
8. Plaintiff was issued 11,945 (eleven thousand nine 
hundred forty-five) shares of stock in the Company (including the 
500 (five hundred) shares referred to in paragraph 7 above) for 
securing releases by the preferred shareholders of their stock 
conversion rights. The foregoing issue was made in confirmation 
of discussions and agreements in October 1982 with members of the 
Board. (See Exhibits 7 and 23) The said shares of the Company 
were subject to recall by the Company as provided in letters of 
understanding signed by the Plaintiff dated September 20, 1982 
and December 8, 1982 (see Exhibits 3, 4, and 5). 
9. Stock certificate number 103 in the amount of 11,945 
(eleven thousand nine hundred forty-five shares) was issued to 
-4-
48 
RICHARD S. SMITH on or about December 7, 1982. (Stipulated) 
10. The terms and conditions of the letters dated 
September 20, 1982 and December 8, 1982, permitted ROCKY MOUNTAIN 
HELICOPTERS, INC*, to recall the stock represented by certificate 
number 103, at no cost if: (1) SMITH resigned as a director and 
employee of the Company; (2) SMITH was terminated for reasonable 
cause; (3) SMITH died; or (4) SMITH left the Company for other 
reasons; unless prior to one of those events ROCKY MOUNTAIN 
HELICOPTERS, INC. was sold or participated in a successful public 
or private offering of its common stock. If the Company was sold 
or participated in a successful public or private offering of its 
common stock, then the option to call the stock would expire. 
(Stipulated - see Exhibits 3, 4, and 5) 
11. At the time the disputed shares were issued, Plaintiff 
was fully aware of the terms and conditions governing the 
issuance of the stock (particularly 11,445 (eleven thousand four 
hundred forty-five) shares), including the right to recall the 
stock as outlined in the letter of Seotember 20, 1982. 
(Stipulated) 
12. All of the transactions involving the issuance of stock 
were approved by the Board of Directors of ROCKY MOUNTAIN 
HELICOPTERS, INC. at a Board of Directors meeting occurring on 
November 15, 1983. (Stipulated) 
13. During 1983, Mr. SMITH negotiated with Offshore 
Logistics for the sale of ROCKY MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS and in 
October of 1983, a letter of intent for the sale of ROCKY 
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MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS to Offshore Logistics was negotiated. The 
transaction was accepted and ratified by the Board of Directors 
at a meeting on November 15, 1983. A draft of a sale contract 
for the transfer of ROCKY MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS' assets was 
prepared. However, the sale was never consummated, in that the 
final terms of the agreement were never agreed to by the parties. 
Offshore Logistics, Inc. reduced and changed its initial offer to 
purchase prior to finalization of the drafted sales contract. 
14. Towards the latter part of 1983, and as a result of 
differences regarding corporate policy, a rift arose between Mr. 
Burr and Plaintiff. (Stipulated) 
15. As a result of the major differences between the 
Plaintiff and Mr. Burr, Plaintiff's position with the Company was 
changed by Mr. Burr in a hand-written letter to Plaintiff. The 
letter stated: "If the present sale proposal fails, you will be 
asked to return your shares of stock December 31, 1983." (See 
Exhibit 11) The sale proposal to which reference is made in the 
hand-written letter is that sale proposal to Offshore Logistics. 
'^hf ^6# T4m uluih—Mas not ratTriiimJ by Dtfi'tfmbtfr 31, 1003 and 
Plaintiff and the Company, through James B. Burr, agreed to 
4LOOO1VO their differences by placing stock certificate number 103 
in escrow for a period of 1 (one) year and, during that period, 
Plaintiff would be retained by the Company, pursuant to a 
Consulting Agreement, with the principal assignment of attempting 
to sell the Company or raise equity funding. This agreement was 
memorialized in a writing dated February 15, 1984 which consisted 
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of a Consulting Agreement prepared by Plaintiff and Mr. Burr and 
an Escrow Agreement prepared by Mr. Burr's attorney, Jerry Thorn. 
The actual date of signing of the Escrow Agreement was February 
27, 1984. (See Exhibits 13 and 14) 
17. Under the Consulting Agreement, Plaintiff promised to 
be a consultant for ROCKY MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS, to continue his 
efforts either to sell ROCKY MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS or to arrange 
for an equity injection of funds into ROCKY MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS 
through a public or private placement of stock, and was to 
receive consideration for such services in|the amount of $275.00 
(two hundred seventy-five dollars) per day or $137.50 (one 
hundred thirty-seven dollars and fifty cents) per half day for 
the time Plaintiff spent rendering such services to the Company. 
As additional consideration Plaintiff was to receive medical and 
dental insurance, continued life insurance and associated health 
insurance, and $1,000 (one thousand dollars) spousal travel upon 
approval. In addition, Plaintiff was to receive the benefit of 
having his income tax returns prepared for 1983, the use of Xerox 
and Watts lines for personal use, and an office at ROCKY MOUNTAIN 
HELICOPTERS to work on his other activities. The agreement 
provided for an exchange of accrued vacation, sick time and 
separation benefits in return for an Oldsmobile automobile, 
including 4 (four) new tires. The agreement further provided for 
the exchange of Plaintiff1s receivable from Windgate Oil for a 
Suburban automobile. Finally, Plaintiff was to receive 50 
(fifty) gallons of gasoline per month. 
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18. The Escrow Agreement (dated February 27, 1984) provides 
that if, during the 1 (one) year period: 
"ROCKY MOUNTAIN HELICOPTER, INC. is sold to 
a third party or parties, either by virtue 
of a majority of its assets being purchased 
or, in the alternative, any public or private 
sale of its stock or the stock of any sub-
sidiary takes place, then and in that event, 
the shares of stock represented by the 
certificates deposited herewith will be 
returned to Richard S. Smith; provided that 
if any negotiations for sale of assets of 
stock have begun prior to the expiration of 
one (1) year from the date hereof that result 
in such a sale, then and in that event, such 
sale will be considered to have occurred within 
the one (1) year previously mentioned herein. 
Provided further that in the event that condi-
tions described herein do not occur within 
one (1) year from the date of this Agreement, 
then the stock represented by the certificate 
No. will be returned to ROCKY MOUNTAIN 
HELICOPTER, INC." 
The Escrow Agreement further stated it replaced the 
agreements of September 20, 1982 and December 8, 1982. (See 
Exhibit 14) 
19. At no time during the one (1) year period of the Escrow 
Agreement did ROCKY MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS, INC. sell any of its 
stock or assets nor did it participate in any public or private 
sale of its stock or the stock of any subsidiary. 
20. Plaintiff confirmed in the Consulting Agreement of 
February 15, 1984, his resignation as "Chief Financial Officer, 
Vice President — Finance, and Treasurer of ROCKY MOUNTAIN 
HELICOPTERS, INC., as well as any other positions of officership 
which I might hold with any subsidiary companies of ROCKY 
MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS, INC." The resignation had effect from 
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January 1, 1984. (Stipulated) 
21. On or about March 2, 1984, Plaintiff resigned as a 
Director of ROCKY MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS, INC. (Stipulated) 
22. Plaintiff's testimony and position is that the language 
of the Escrow Agreement (Exhibit 14) was intended to eliminate 
the right of recall of Plaintiff's stock as provided in the 
letter agreements of September 20, 1982 and December 8, 1982. 
(Exhibits 3 and 4) Plaintiff further contends that this change 
was discussed by the Plaintiff with attorney Jerry Thorn. 
23. Burr's testimony and the position of Defendant Company 
is that the language of the Escrow Agreement (Exhibit 14) did 
not, nor was it ever intended to, eliminate the right to recall 
Plaintiff's stock as provided in the letter agreements of 
September 20, 1982 and December 8, 198|2. (Exhibits 3 and 4) 
Furthermore, it is the position of Defendant Company, and Mr. 
Burr testified, that there was never any discussion regarding the 
elimination of the right of recall, between Plaintiff and Burr, 
or between Burr and attorney Jerry Thorn. 
24. On April 16, 1984, ROCKY MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS, sued the 
Plaintiff on a matter unrelated to this lawsuit. That action was 
settled on or about April 19, 1984. Based on that lawsuit and 
other factors, the relationship between ROCKY MOUNTAIN 
HELICOPTERS, Jim Burr, and Plaintiff was left strained. 
25. Plaintiff's Consulting Agreement was terminated by Mr. 
Burr for and in behalf of the Company on April 23, 1984 • (See 
Exhibit 20) 
-9-
5
^ 
26. Burr contends Plaintiff's Consulting Agreement was 
terminated due to Plaintiff's lack of availability* 
27. Plaintiff contends the Consulting Agreement was 
terminated as part of Defendant's reaction to the settlement of 
the lawsuit referred to in Finding number 24 above and further to 
preclude Plaintiff from trying to either sell or add additional 
equity to the Company. 
28. Plaintiff did not perform any consulting services or 
render any service at all for the Company under the Consulting 
Agreement. 
29. Plaintiff and Burr, for and on behalf of the Company, 
had not agreed upon any specific parameters for the selling of 
the Company or any specific parameters for additional infusion of 
capital into the Company. For the Court to establish such 
parameters would be highly speculative and it would be even more 
speculative on the part of the Court to determine that Plaintiff 
could have performed, given the chance be believed he was 
prevented, by Burr, from having. 
30. The Court finds that Plaintiff's termination by Burr, 
did not completely frustrate and prevent Plaintiff from finding a 
buyer for the Company within the 1 (one) year time period. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court hereby 
enters these: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Consulting Agreement was wrongfully terminated as 
it relates to the following items, and as such Plaintiff is 
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entitled to a judgment against the Defendant Company as follows: 
A. $600 (six hundred dollars) for a gasoline benefit; 
B. $2,699.55 (two thousand six hundred ninety-nine 
dollars and fifty-five cents) for medical and insurance expenses 
of the Plaintiff incurred during the term of the Consulting 
Agreement. 
2. Plaintiff's claim for compensation for consulting 
services is without any legal basis inasmuch as he did not work, 
nor was there any absolute provision providing a minimum of work 
days. Defendant Company could have provided as many as 8 (eight) 
work days a month or as few as no work days a month. 
3. Defendant Company is entitled to the return of 11,445 
(eleven thousand four hundred forty-five) shares of stock issued 
to Plaintiff, inasmuch as the Consulting Agreement and the Escrow 
Agreement provided for the return of stock in the event that the 
Company was not sold or a public or private sale of equity was 
not effected. The Company was not sold nor was there a public or 
private sale of equity. To believe the Plaintiff could have sold 
the Company or effected a public or private sale of equity within 
1 (one) year, when there was no agreement as to the terms of 
either would be speculative. 
4. Plaintiff is entitled to own the 500 (five hundred) 
shares of Company stock issued to him as a bonus in connection 
with years of service rendered. Since the Company elected to 
issue such shares as a stock bonus, such shares so issued should 
not be a part of the stock issued under the call provisions of 
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t h e l e t t e r a g r e e m e n t s or the p r o v i s i o n s of the C o n s u l t i n g 
Agreement and the Escrow Agreement. 
Dated t h i s JZ? day of L>^v,^ , 1987. 
>yd L. Park, Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby c e r t i f y that a true and correct copy of the above 
and f o r e g o i n g F i n d i n g s of Fact and C o n c l u s i o n s of Law was 
furnished by mail t o : Frederick A. Jackman, Esq. 1327 South 800 
East , Su i te 300, Orem, UT 84058 t h i s $Q d aY o f m 
'ML. 
1987. 
Mollie Ungricht 
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Appendix Exhibit E 
ROBERT S. YOUNG 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS, INC. 
Post Office Box 1337 
Provo, UT 84603 
801-375-1124 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD S. SMITH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS, 
INC., a Utah corporation, and 
EXECUTIVE ESCROW SERVICES, a 
Utah corporation. 
Defendants. 
Trial of this matter occurred on the 11th day of March, 
1987, commencing at 9:00 AM. The Court, having entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, hereby: 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES 
1. Judgment is hereby entered against Defendant, ROCKY 
MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS, INC., and in favor of Plaintiff for the sum 
of $3,299.55 (three thousand two hundred ninety-nine dollars and 
fifty-five cents) as compensation to Plaintiff for loss of 
gasoline benefits and medical and insurance expenses to which 
Plaintiff was entitled under the Consulting Agreement of February 
15, 1984. 
2. Defendant, EXECUTIVE ESCROW SERVICES, is ordered to 
return to Defendant, ROCKY MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS, INC., stock 
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ORDER OF JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 68^775 
certificate number 103, issued to Plaintiff, and representing 
11,945 (eleven thousand nine hundred forty-five) shares of stock 
in Defendant, ROCKY MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS, INC. Said certificate 
may be cancelled by Defendant, ROCKY MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS, INC., 
and the shares represented thereby returned to said Defendant. 
3. Defendant, ROCKY MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS, INC., is hereby 
ordered to issue to Plaintiff a new stock certificate reflecting 
the ownership by Plaintiff of 500 (five hundred) shares of the 
common stock of Defendant, ROCKY MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS, INC. 
Plaintiff is entitled to the foregoing shares as a result of the 
stock bonus issued to various employees based upon years of 
service rendered. 
Dated this ,c^ £? day o f ^ ^y^^\Jt^ , 1987. 
Boyd L. Park, Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that the above and foregoing Order of 
Judgment was furnished by mail to Frederick A. Jackman, Esq., 
1327 South 800 East, Suite 300, Orem, UT 84058 thi i s
 Jo day of 
, 1987. 
t.(lhmrJt 
Mdllie Ungricht 7] 
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DESIGNATION OF CASE AND PARTIES 
AS THEY APPEARED IN THE TRIAL COURT 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD S. SMITH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS, 
INC., a Utah corporation, and 
EXECUTIVE ESCROW SERVICES, a 
Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 68775 
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DESIGNATION OF PARTIES 
AS THEY APPEARED IN COURT OF APPEALS 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD S. SMITHf 
Plaintiff, Appellant, 
and Cross-Respondent 
vs. 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
Defendant, Respondent, 
and Cross-Appellant 
and EXECUTIVE ESCROW SERVICES, a 
Utah corporation, 
Defendant . 
Court of Appeals 
N o . 870511 -C A 
Supreme Court 
No. 870265 
Priority No. 14b 
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